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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jessica Halbesleben appeals from her convictions on two counts of felony
injury to a child, asserting that the state breached the plea agreement by making
a sentencing argument which impliedly disavowed its recommendation.
Appellant also asserts that her sentence of 10 years with the first 3 years fixed on
each count to run consecutive, for a total sentence of 20 years with the first 6
years fixed, was excessive, and that the district court erred in denying her I.C.R.
35 motion

Statement of Facts
While some more detail will be provided below, generally speaking, the
facts as provided in the indictment for the two counts of which Ms. Halbesleben
was convicted are as follows:
COUNT l
That the defendants, THOMAS AND JESSICA HALBESLEBEN, on
or between October 2002 and February 25, 2005, in the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, did, under circumstances likely to cause great
bodily harm, commit an injury upon a child under eighteen years of
age, to-wit:
of the ages of 2, 3, and 4, by unlawfully and
willfully causing or permitting the child to be placed in a situation
endangering her health or person, while having care and/or custody
of the child, by allowing unsu
sed contact with her older
brothers:
age 10 to 12 and
age 8 to 10, who they knew
had sexually penetrated Autumn's body on multiple occasions.
COUNT I1
That the defendants, THOMAS AND JESSICA HALBESLEBEN, on
or between October 2002 and February 25, 2005, in the County of

Ada, State of Idaho, did, under circumstances likely to cause great
bodily harm, commit an injury upon a child under eighteen years of
age, to-wit:
of the ages of 7 1/2 months to 2 years, by
unlawfully and willfully causing or permitting the child to be placed
in a situation endangering her health or person, while having care
andlor custody of t
, by allowing uns
ised contact with
ge 8 to 10, who
her older brothers:
ge 10 to 12 and
they knew had sexually penetrated
ody on multiple
occasions.
Indictment, p. 1-2. (R. p. 6-7.)

Course of Proceedinqs
On May 4, 2005,

a

grand jury indictment was filed charging Ms.

Halbesleben and her husband at the time, Thomas Halbesleben, with four counts
of felony Injury to a Child, contrary to I.C. section 18-1501(1). (R. p. 6-8.)

Ms.

Halbesleben brought a motion to dismiss indictment which was denied by the
district court. (R. p. 21-31; 79-83.)
Then, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ms. Halbesleben pled guilty
to two counts of felony injury to a child and the other two counts were dismissed,
as was a separate misdemeanor charge of failure to report sex abuse. (R. p. 93.)
The material terms of the plea agreement, which was not binding on the court,
provided that the state would recommend sentences of one year fixed followed
by nine years indeterminate on each count to run consecutive but that the
defense would request a lesser sentence. (R. p. 93-94.) Also, the agreement
specifically provided that the parties intended that the defendant serve no more
than two years before becoming parole eligible, and if the ldaho Department of
Corrections interpreted the sentence in a different manner, then the defendant

would have the right to a new sentencing. (R. p. 94.)

At a change of plea

hearing, the court accepted the guilty plea. (R. p. 97.)
At the sentencing occurring on May 4, 2006, the district court sentenced
Ms. Halbesleben to three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate on
each count, to run consecutive, or in other words, a total sentence of twenty
years with the first six years fixed. (R. p. 116.)

No appeal was filed from the

judgment of conviction.
On August 31, 2006, Ms. Halbesleben brought, though counsel, a Rule 35
motion seeking a reduction of her sentence, which the district court denied. (R. p.
118-129; 130-134.) Appellant timely appealed from the denial of her Rule 35
motion. (R. p. 135-137.) That appeal was assigned docket no. 33578.
While this appeal was pending but before Appellant's brief was filed, Ms.
Halbesleben filed a petition for post conviction relief alleging, infer alia, that her
attorney did not file the requested appeal from her sentence. The district court
ultimately granted relief on that issue and reentered the judgment, from which a
timely notice of appeal was filed.

(R. 35037, p. 11-13.')

This appeal was

assigned docket number 35037 and the two appeals were conso~idated.~

Except where indicated, all citations are to the record in docket no. 33578

he appeal of the denial of Ms. Halbesleben's other claims for post conviction
relief was assigned docket no. 35029 and was consolidated as well. However,
Appellant is contemporaneously herewith moving to sever that case from Docket
nos. 33578 and 35037.

ISSUES

I.

Whether Ms. Halbesleben is entitled to withdraw her guilty plea
because the state breached the plea agreement by impliedly
disavowing the recommendation it was required to make.

11.

Whether the district court erred by imposing an excessive sentence
andlor by denying the I.C.R. rule 35 motion for sentence reduction.

ARGUMENT
I.
MS. HALBESLEBEN IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY PLEA
BECAUSE THE STATE BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY IMPLIEDLY
DISAVOWING THE RECOMMENDATION IT WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE

In this case, the terms of the written non-binding plea agreement provided
that the state would recommend sentences of one year fixed followed by nine
years indeterminate on each count to run consecutive but that the defense
would request a lesser sentence. (R. p. 93-94.)

As will be explained at length

below, Appellant asserts that the state breached the plea agreement because
while it did remember as an afterthought to make that recommendation at
sentencing, the state's entire argument effectively renounced the imposition of
that relatively lenient sentence
First, as a threshold matter, while Ms. Halbesleben did not object below, it
is well established that the breach of a plea agreement is fundamental error
which may be raised for the first time on appeal. As explained by the ldaho
Court ofAppeals in State v. Jones, 139 ldaho 299, 77 P.3d 988 (Ct.App. 2003):
Jones did not object to the prosecutor's statements at sentencing
nor later file a motion for relief in the trial court. Ordinarily, this
Court will not address an issue that was not initially presented to
the trial court. Nevertheless, because a breach of a plea agreement
is fundamental error, a claim of such a breach may be considered
for the first time on appeal if the record provided is sufficient for that
purpose.
Id., p. 301 (internal citations omitted).

In our case, the record is sufficient since the plea agreement was written
and is part of our record, as is the prosecutor's later arguments at sentencing.3
As to the merits of the issue regarding the breach of a plea agreement,
Jones explained as follows:
It is well established that "when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92
S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). This principle is
derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule
that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47,
81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442-43 (1984); If the prosecution has breached its
promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was
intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea
was knowing and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead
guilty on a false premise. In such event, the defendant will be
entitled to relief. Sanfobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30
L.Ed.2d at 433; Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508-09, 104 S.Ct. at 2546-47,
81 L.Ed.2d at 442-43; As a remedy, the court may order specific
performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to
withdraw the guilty plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at
499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433; . . . .
The prosecution's obligation to recommend a sentence promised in
a plea agreement does not carry with it the obligation to make the
recommendation enthusiastically. A prosecutor may not circumvent
a plea agreement, however, through words or actions that convey a
reservation about a promised recommendation, nor may a
prosecutor impliedly disavow the recommendation as something
which the prosecutor no longer supports. Although prosecutors
need not use any particular form of expression in recommending an
agreed sentence, "their overall conduct must be reasonably
consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the
reverse."
Id., p. 301-302 (internal citations omitted).

Also, the breach of plea issue is properly raised in this appeal from the
reentered judgment since it could have been raised in an original appeal from
the judgment (had it been filed), because said issue arises out of sentencing
and can be pursued despite the entry of an unconditional plea of guilty.

6

The state's recommendation at the sentencing appears below, and while it
is lengthy, that is a large part of the point. The prosecutor argued as follows:
In the last ten years, there has not been a worse case of child
abuse in this county than what this defendant managed to
accomplish in 13 years.
From the minute she began having children, these babies were at
risk. None of these children ever had a chance because they were
born to the defendant and her husband.
Their first daughter and son were removed from-from their care by
the state of Georgia for maltreatment. Little Victoria was without her
mother and father only at the age of 2. Travis was barely 1. After
five months of being cared for by strangers, Victoria and Travis
were returned, and the defendant and her codefendant moved to
Idaho where they began having a baby every year-babies they
had no business having because they had no foreseeable ability to
financially care or support them and no ability to emotionally
support, nurture, encourage, discipline or parent them.
The system failed these children only because the system is set up
to only be able to respond when it is dealing with children who are
not brainwashed and trained by their parents not to talk to anyone,
especially police or social workers. "Keep it in the family, or they will
be taken away forever."
By the time she caused-by the time her husband had caused a 4inch gash to her 4-year old's head and she takes him to the
emergent [sic] care center, she had had five children. These
children had been to foster care twice. The second time, they were
removed due to neglect and maltreatment. Travis, at age 5, was
molested by a boy in his foster home. The babies the defendant
allowed her older children to molest and rape for the last four years
were not even born yet.
She is the one who took little Jimmy, age 4, to the emergent [sic]
care facility where the doctor called the police. All of those
children-all five-were, again, placed into foster care for the third
time. Social workers had to keep moving Jimmy because he was so
destructive at the age of 4. He was evaluated by Dr. Woody, clinical
psychiatrist, who determined that, at the age of 4, he had posttraumatic stress and was classified as severely, emotionally
disturbed. He was also prescribed a healthy dose of antipsychotic
meds and antidepressants.

Bothsparentstold the Department of Heath and Welfare that Jimmy
caused all of the problems. And it was the Department's belief, at
that time, that Jimmy was what we call a "target child." Both the
defendant and her codefendant voluntary terminated on Jimmy,
and they walked away from him.
They neglected and abused and maltreated these children to the
point that they are saddened and burdened with significant and
diagnosable psychological problems, medical problems, intellectual
development problem. And then, they walk away from Jimmy. They
just wash their hands of him, at age 4. That's the age you still
believe in Santa Claus. And the thought of your parents
abandoning you and leaving you doesn't even enter onto the radar.
Instead of working a plan to get her son back in her arms, she left
him behind.
Jimmy's siblings-they don't remember him, really. They know that
when the police saw his injury, he kind of disappeared, and their
parents didn't care and let him disappear. They didn't fight for him. I
don't know where Jimmy is today, but I can only imagine what he is
at the age of 11, being psychotic at the age of 4, as a result of what
he survived.
Every single one of these children is delayed and has major
intellectual deficiencies. There is no proof in this record that they
were born that way. You have page after page of school records
from all of the professionals who encountered these children from
the Boise to the Meridian School Districts.
If these children were born with some cognitive deficit or delay,
certainly a routine and nurturing and stimulation would have
bettered their outcomes. it's almost a worse situation if it's alleged
later by counsel that somehow they were just born like this.
After the defendant's-after her picture appeared on the news
when she was finally arrested, I got a cold call from a woman by the
name of Lynda Mehrens who was almost in tears. And she was the
preschooler teacher for Victoria and Travis when they were only 3
and 4 years of age, and they were in desperate need of interaction,
nurturing, stimulation, and routine.
You could count the days the defendant managed to get these
children to school on one hand. She documented the bruises, the
dirty clothes, the hunger, the soreness from being thrown in a
closet or door. It's all there, and she says to me, "I knew someday
something was going to happen, and I saved this file on these two

children." She kept her own personal file because she knew she
could not get any help for them.
She writes, "These two children, Travis and Victoria Halbesleben,
were the worst abuse and neglect cases I have ever dealt with in
my 30 years of teaching young special needs children." This
woman tried to get action until the family decided to quote, "get
Health and Welfare off their back by moving to Council with her
codefendant's parents." Those are her words.
The defendant, then, moved back to Boise, eventually, when
Victoria was only 6, and that's when her codefendant husband first
began to sexually molest her in her own bed. There was never
enough food in this house. There was no dental care. And the
reports kept being made by concerned citizens and neighbors but
mostly by teachers or contacts the children had at school.
In an effort to insolate the problems, she chose to slowly remove
the children from the school system and claimed to be home
schooling them with a computer that was broken for a long, long
time, actually, that was provided to her. They spent their times idly
watching television, doing chores, or being just essentially locked
away in their rooms.
At this time, Travis in not only molesting the babies, but he had
repeatedly raped his younger brother, Jacob, whose then becomes
a molester to the babies, as well. And you see in the reports that
the District personally met with her and her husband over and over
documenting their concerns that Travis was home schooled. Not
because of the risk he posed to the babies but because he had
made progress in the school, and they didn't want to slow down
that momentum. They had seen improve [sic] with his behavior and
his cognitive abilities, and they believed him to be-removing him
from this social setting was going to be a major setback.
Nevertheless, she removed him.
And now, we know, ultimately, he had more access to the babies
during the day while she is smoking meth in the garage in a home
where there is very little food. She has to go and rely on charitable
organizations to give her food, and yet, she has money for meth.
Never understood that. Eight starving children, and she is smoking
a bowl of meth when they should be eating a bowl of food.
By this time, the defendant's husband is now having full intercourse
to ejaculation with his older daughter who is now pretty much doing
the best that she can to live this Cinderella life that her own mother

thrusts upon her. She did the cooking with what little bit of supplies
she had. She did the cleaning, which was an overwhelming task for
any person, adult, let alone a young girl who is trying to go to junior
high.
And then, she was responsible for going to bed with the babies until
her parents told her to go ahead and go to bed so her brothers
can't molest the babies, which is the worst part of this case and
what this case was ultimately brought into this courtroom.
Imagine, if you will, knowing that what pathetic efforts you claim to
make to protect an infant toddler and preschooler from their oversexualized, highly sexualized, molesting brothers that those efforts
don't work, and you don't do anything about it. How cruel it is for
the defendant to fail to help her sons stop molesting, knowing that
those boys-those two boys are going to carry that-what they did
to their own siblings-for the rest of their lives.
We have eight children now who are orphans because of her
crimes. Her contribution in the world is making eight wards of the
state for the next 16 years.
So, not only do we get to pay financially, but the hours these social
workers and foster parents and teachers will spending driving them
and encouraging them though counseling and school and
comforting them like the night when their parents who were
supposed to be there for them weren't, reassuring them there is
enough to eat and constantly trying to bolster their self-esteem.
Those costs and harm that she caused are truly incalculable. And
these are children that came from her flesh-that she carried all
eight of these babies.
The magnitude of the harm this defendant has caused by her
crimes I try not to think about, but it's haunting. We need to be
protected, obviously, from this defendant, but I think the most
significant piece of this case for this defendant is that anything less
than what the state recommends-and we encourage you to follow
our recommendation-would depreciate the seriousness of what she
has done over a long period of time.
This didn't happen overnight. This didn't happen because she is
poor. We live in a county where our children's hospital are like
palaces. We have resources available or food and free dental
care and all of those things. And she sat in the garage and smoked
meth.

Anything less than 1 year fixed followed by 9 indeterminate for 10,
consecutive to 1 plus nine for 10, would depreciate the seriousness
of what she did. We are not requesting restitution in this case
because I can't even begin to calculate, and I don't think she has
the means to ever pay.
Tr. 5/3/06, p. 2, In. 16-p.

10, In. 5.

Incidentally, defense counsel below disagreed with various assertions and
characterizations by the state, but they will not be detailed here because what
actually happened is not the point. Instead, the issue is whether or not the
state's argument constitutes a violation of the plea agreement.
Appellant asserts that it is. The prosecutor paid only lip service to the plea
agreement by adding, in what appears to be a barely remembered afterthought,
a recommendation of 10 years with 1 year fixed on each count to run
consecutive. However, the prosecutor's vigorous argument was fundamentally
at odds with such a recommendation.
Our case is similar to several of those of the ldaho Court of Appeals
holding that the state breached the plea agreement by its recommendation at
sentencing. For example in

State v. Daubs, 140 ldaho 299, 92 P.3d 549

(Ct.App. 2004), the Court of Appeals explained as follows:
The state argues that Daubs did not face the sort of egregious
disregard of a plea agreement that Lankford criticizes. However,
disregard of a plea agreement can be made manifest in more than
one way. Here, the prosecution stated:
Your honor, I have spoken with [the prosecutor assigned to
the case], and the State has agreed to recommend no more
than a Rider in this case.
The PSI investigator, however, clearly is recommending
prison based on the nature of Mr. Daub's crimes, his prior
record, and his substance abuse problems.

Rather than having me restate the information presented to
the Court in the PSI and in the letters from the victims, I
would ask that this Court hear from [the victim's parents],
who are here. They're better able than I am to explain the
horrific consequences that this crime has had on them, their
daughters, and their entire family.
This language, when taken in context of the entire proceeding, is
clearly fundamentally at odds with the terms of the plea agreement.
. . . . We conclude that the statements and evidence given to the
sentencing judge amount to an abrogation of the plea agreement,
and a tacit adoption of a recommendation altogether different than
the one for which the state and defendant had bargained.
Id. p. 301
I

In State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 102 P.3d 380 (Ct.App. 2004), the Court
of Appeals rejected the state's contention that the prosecutor's argument was

I

necessary to rebut the defendant's request for a more lenient sentence. The
I
I

I

Court of Appeals stated, referring back to Jones, supra:
Although the prosecutor [in Jones] uttered the required
recommendation, we concluded that her other statements
effectively renounced that recommendation. Similarly, here, the
prosecutor articulated the sentences the state agreed to
recommend, while presenting vigorous argument that was
inconsistent with that recommendation.
Wills, p. 775-776.
Our case is also like Wills in that compared to the sentence that Ms.
Halbesleben could have received (as well as what she actually received), the
state's recommendation of basically two years fixed was relatively lenient. But,
similar to what the Court of Appeals stated in Wills,

"...as in Lankford, the

prosecutor's arguments, taken as a whole, were not reasonably consistent with
the lenient sentences that the state was obligated to recommend." Id., p. 776.

Appellant asserts that no more need to be said on this issue because the
prosecutor said it all. In short, the state breached the plea agreement when it
paid only mild lip service to the recommendation which it agreed to make and
instead made the lengthy argument detailed above which was totally at odds
with its recommendation.

Even if the state felt compelled to advocate for the

recommended sentence in order to rebut the defense's argument for a more
lenient one, the argument actually was in a word, overkill. The prosecutor's
argument far exceeded anything even remotely necessary to ensure that Ms.
Halbesleben would serve a penitentiary sentence given the circumstances of the
case.
The breach is clear, and as explained above, it results in a plea which was
not voluntary and intelligent and is also a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the United State Constitution. Since Ms. Halbesleben was denied the benefit of
her bargain, as mentioned above, two remedies are available, to wit, specific
performance or withdrawal of the plea agreement.

First

and

foremost,

Appellant requests that she be allowed to withdraw her guilty pleas, but
alternatively requests resentencing by a different judge.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING AN EXCESSIVE
SENTENCE AND/OR BY DENYING THE I.C.R. 35 MOTION FOR
SENTENCE REDUCTION

A.

Introduction
Ms. Halbesleben asserts that the district court imposed an excessive total

sentence when it ran her two sentences consecutive to another which resulted in
a sentence of 20 years with the first 6 years fixed. Ms. Halbesleben

also

asserts that the district court erred in denying her I.C.R. Rule 35 motion.
Appellant will point out that these issues are very closely related. In fact,
the sentencing considerations were more clearly discussed in writing in the Rule
35 motion and the denial thereof, and so Appellant will refer to them below
instead of the sentencing itself, although the information is relevant to both
issues.
B.

Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing a sentence is well established. In State v.

Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 939 P.2d 1372 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:

. . . '[wlhere a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence.' State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577,
602 P.2d 71, 75 (1979). In determining whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion, we review all the facts and
circumstances of the case. State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141,
143, 814 P.2d 401, 403 (1991). In order to show an abuse of
discretion, the defendant must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the
facts. Id. at 145, 814 P.2d at 405. The governing criteria, or
objectives of criminal punishment are: ( 3 ) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. Id. (quoting Sfafe v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582
P.2d 728, 730 (1978)).
Jackson, p. 295
The standards for reviewing the denial of an I.C.R. Rule 35 motion have
recently been comprehensively explained by the Supreme Court in State

v.

Adair, 145 ldaho 514, 181 P.3d 440 (2008):
A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence applies to three different
situations. It provides a procedure for (1) correction of an illegal
sentence, (2) correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, and (3) authorizing the court to reduce a lawful sentence
that, after further examination, is unduly harsh. "[A1 motion to
reduce a legal sentence imposed in a legal manner is addressed to
the sound discretion of the district court." A court does not abuse its
discretion if (1) the court recognizes the decision as one of
discretion, (2) the court acts within the bounds of that discretion and
applies appropriate legal standards, and (3) the court reaches the
decision through an exercise of reason.
The defendant has the burden of showing that a sentence is
excessive if the sentence is within the statutory limits. "A sentence
is excessive if it is unreasonable under any rational view of the
facts." A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is a plea for
leniency. If the original sentence is not excessive, then the
defendant must show at the trial court level that additional facts or
information make the sentence excessive in light of that additional
information. "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot
be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information." Sfafe v. Huffman, 144 ldaho 201,
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).
Id. 181 P.3d, p. 442 (internal citations omitted).

C.

The Rule 35 Motion and the Court's Denial of the Motion
Ms. Halbesleben

filed a I.C.R. r~ile35 motion requesting that her

sentence be reduced for various reasons which will be described in detail below.
First, the motion asserted that while the court was not bound by the plea

agreement, compelling reasons exist to follow it.

(R. p. 119.)

The plea

agreement provided value for everyone involved, by pleading guilty, her children
did not have to testify against her, and also saved the time and expense of a
lengthy trial. (R. p. 119-120.)
Second, practical case management concerns support a sentence in
which Ms. Halbesleben received the benefit of her plea bargain. (R. p. 120.) The
veteran prosecutor, after presumably considering the same factors as the court
did, negotiated a plea agreement containing a recommended sentence reflecting
the perceived value of the case. (R. p. 120.) Furthermore, while the parties
understood that the court is not bound by a plea agreement, they nevertheless
expect that the sentence will be somewhere in the ballpark of the negotiated
plea agreement, and since it was not here, this case will be used as a benchmark
by counsel when advising clients whether or not to accept a negotiated plea
resolution. (R. p. 121.)
Furthermore, the motion argued that the case presents differently than
other cases because the co-defendant did receive the benefit of his plea bargain.
Mr. Halbesleben deserved the 15 year fixed sentence that he received because
he had a prior felony conviction (of a similar nature) and also sexually molested
his oldest daughter. (R. p. 121.) While the court followed the plea agreement in
his case, it did not with Ms. Halbesleben, although she had essentially no prior
record, no allegations that she sexually abused her children and was not more or
less culpable than her husband for failing to protect the children. (R. p. 121-122.)

The motion requested that the court reconsider the sentence for these reasons.
(R. p. 122.)
The motion also argued that the recognized sentencing factors support the
imposition of the plea resolution. First, society is protected from Ms. Halbesleben
since she physically can no longer have children, and conditions of release can
insure that she not live with or care for any minor child. (R. p 122.) Outside of
the facts of the case, society needs no protection from her since she has a
minimal record and a work history and can (and will) work again. (R. p. 122-123.)
Also, since it will be the parole commission who would have to be convinced that
she is a good candidate for parole (and since it appears that fewer inmates are
being paroled when first eligible according to defense counsel), the negotiated
plea sentence provides for the protection of society. (R. p. 123.)
As to deterrence, generally speaking, it is met by a sentence of up to 20
years for failure to protect one's children. (R. p. 124.) As to specific deterrence,
the negotiated prison term would be sufficient, and further fixed time would not
likely add to it. (R. p. 123.) Also, since she cannot have additional children nor
have her children returned to her, there is no further need to deter her from
parenting again. (R, p. 123.) As to retribution, the state's opinion as to the
retribution necessary was demonstrated by the negotiated plea agreement, and
furthermore, two years was not necessarily the only punishment to be imposed,
since Ms. Halbesleben was not guaranteed release after two years and even
when released, would have to comply with the terms of her parole for the
remainder of her sentence. (R. p. 124.)

Finally as to rehabilitation, Ms. Halbesleben was married at age seventeen
into a less than ideal environment. She was essentially a single mother whose
husband committed unspeakable crimes against their oldest daughter, and while
she did try to leave her husband she ultimately returned. (R. p. 124.) However,
she appears to be intelligent and capable of working and giving back to society,
and since she has divorced her husband and no longer has any parental rights,
she should not face impediments in becoming a productive member of society.
(R. p. 124-125.)
Finally, the motion reiterated the parity in sentencing argument where the
co-defendant did receive the benefit of his plea bargain. The motion stated that
as counsel understands the proceedings, the co-defendant in the case
negotiated a recommended sentence requiring that he serve 15 years fixed, and
the state agreed to dismiss two counts of felony injury to a child and the Lewd
and Lascivious Conduct charges filed against him. The same district judge
followed the plea agreement and sentenced him to a minimum of 15 years fixed.4
(R. p. 125.) Mr. Halbesleben had a previous conviction for Felony Injury to a
Child, where he had injured one of his sons by putting a hole in his head. At the
time of this incident Ms. Halbesleben was at work, and upon her return home,
she examined the injury and took her son to a doctor. Therefore, the difference
in negotiated resolutions makes sense since it reflected the fact that the husband
had a prior conviction for felony injury to a child and was accused of sexually

Thomas Halbesleben was sentenced to 15 years fixed followed by 15 years
indeterminate. (Tr., 5/3/06, p. 27.)
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abusing his oldest daughter. (R. p. 126.)
Mr. Halbesleben was to (and did) receive a fixed sentence of fifteen years.
Ms. Halbesleben contemplated receiving a sentence of 2 years fixed, but instead,
received a sentence of 6 years fixed. Had the court tripled the recommendation
of his fixed time as it did hers, he would have to serve 45 years before being
eligible for parole. (R. p. 126.)
The motion continued by pointing out that

at sentencing, the Court

explained that as a mother, Ms. Halbesleben had a greater duty to protect her
children that perhaps a father.5 (R. p. 126.)

The motion continued by stating

that it must be remembered that Ms. Halbesleben was not much more than a
child bride herself, having been married at 17, and due to her youth, lacked much
of the life experience necessary to raise a family and/or to deal with her husband.
(R. p. 126-127.) She went from living at home to being a wife to being a parent
in short order, and until her incarceration, she had never known life without the
influence and control of her husband. (R. p. 126.) The motion states that "[tlhere
can be little doubt that Mr. Halbesleben got what he wanted when he wanted
without any of the obligation." Rule 35 motion at p. 10. (R. p. 127.) However, the
motion specifically did not elaborate since the same district judge also sentenced
Mr. Halbesleben and so was familiar with him. (R. p. 127.)
Other facts and factors that helped shape the plea agreement included the
situation in 1995 when the children were removed from the home, and while in

Actually, the court pointed out that historically, mothers in particular have
incredible protective instincts when it comes to their children. (Tr. 5/3/06, p. 29.)
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the custody of the Department of Health and Welfare and in foster care, the
oldest boy was sexually molested. Ms. Halbesleben successfully completed the
case plan and the boys were returned home, but the molestation reared its ugly
head again in 2005, and Ms. Halbesleben told the police that her two older boys
were molesting the younger children. (R. p. 127.)
The motion requested that the court either reduce her sentence to that
recommended by the state, 2 years fixed followed by 18 years indeterminate, or
in the alternative, to amend the sentence imposed to run the fixed portion of her
sentence, 3 years, concurrent rather than consecutive. (R. p. 128.)
The district court denied the motion in a memorandum decision, the
relevant portions of which follow:
The defendant expends a great deal of time focusing upon the
importance of plea agreements in the criminal justice process. The
court has the responsibility for sentencing of a defendant and not
the attorneys in the case. The role of the court is to independently
analyze the factors set forth under Idaho Code $j 19-2604 and to
base its decision upon those factors. Certainlv the Court can
consider the plea negotiations and many times the Court will do so
in reaching a decision as to the appropriate sentence. In this case,
based upon the horrific conditions that multiple children were
placed in as a direct result of the Defendant's actions, the plea
aqreement was inapprooriate based upon the Court's review of the

facts.
The defendant argues that one defendant received the benefit of a
plea negotiation and the other did not. Each case is evaluated on
an individual basis and such an arqument is not only irrelevant, it is
disinaenuous. The Court, in sentencing the defendant in this case,
took into consideration the nature of the crime. The defendant, as
a mother, allowed her teen-age children to molest a three year old
child and a four year old child over a period of time on repeated
occasions. She did nothing to stop this conduct, she was aware of
this conduct and she allowed this despicable conduct to continue
for months. These children will be forever scarred as a result of
this inaction on the part of the Defendant. The defendant further

directly, and certainly indirectly, created a situation where these
children were isolated and therefore agencies of the city, county
and state were denied an opportunity to step in and protect these
children.
In sentencing the defendant then, the Court took into consideration
the nature of the crimes and the horrific impact this will have upon
both the children who were molested, as well as the impact of the
Defendant's actions has had on the children who were doing the
molesting, in essence, a double affect upon children's lives.
Further, the Court looked to general deterrence and specific
deterrence in this case. This defendant has been involved in and
around abuse and neglect of her children even prior to this incident,
yet she continued this conduct. Clearly, society needs to know the
kind of awful conditions that these children were living in and the
ultimate permanent substantial emotional scarring that these
children will bear for the rest of their lives, that significant
punishment was merited under these circumstances.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for
Reduction of Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35.
Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence
Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 - Case No. H0500603, p. 2-4 (emphasis added). (R. p.

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Running the Sentences
Consecutivelv andlor Bv Failina to Reduce the Sentence Upon Reauest
Appellant will discuss the second issue first, to wit, that the district court

erred in denying the Rule 35 motion. In short, Appellant is not simply asserting
that the court should have granted leniency. Rather, Appellant asserts that the
district court abused its discretion in denying the motion because it did not
understand the correct legal standards involved, and thus abused its discretion.
The court did this in two ways. First, its comments in dehying the Rule 35 motion

show that it did not understand that correct legal standards that it should have
used at the change of plea hearing and at the sentencing. However, Appellant
will discuss these errors in terms of the Rule 35 motion because that is were the
court discusses them. Appellant secondly asserts that instead of using the Rule
35 motion to explain what it earlier did (improperly), the court should have used it
as a vehicle to correct those errors.
First and foremost, while Appellant fully understands that the sentence
recommendation contained in the plea bargain was not binding on the court, the
court nevertheless apparently misunderstands the role that plea bargains play in
the criminal justice system. The ldaho Court of Appeals recently described the
importance in

Schoger v. Sfafe, - Idaho -,

- P.3d -,

2008WL3905424

The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea
bargaining," is an essential component of the administration of
justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. ldaho
recognizes guilty pleas obtained through the plea bargaining
process and sets forth the requirements and procedures relating to
such pleas in Rule 11. Among those requirements, a court must
ensure that all guilty pleas are made knowingly and voluntarily so
as to not violate the defendant's constitutional right against being
compelled or coerced to bear witness against himself or herself in a
criminal case.

Id., 2008 WL 3905424 , p. 6 (internal citations omitted).
In sharp contrast to plea bargains being considered to be an essential
component and encouraged, the district court in our case stated that the court
can consider them and "many times" the court will do so. Appellant suggests

that the essential nature of plea bargains requires more than a possibility that the
court consider them.6
Further, the court said that in this case, the plea agreement was
inappropriate based upon the court's review of the facts. However, this is a case
where the court actually knew quite a deal about the facts before the change of
plea hearing. The defense had brought a motion to dismiss the indictment, and
so the evidence presented to the grand jury was detailed to the court, as is clear
from its ruling on the motion. (R. p. 81-82.)

Appellant asserts that since the

court already knew the facts before it was presented with the plea bargain, it
should not have accepted the guilty pleas if it knew that the plea agreement was
inappropriate.
In short, the defendant was led down the garden path by being advised
only that the court was not bound by the sentence recommendation, when in fact,
the court did not even believe that it must consider the recommendation, and
also, the court already knew the facts which it later stated made the plea
agreement inappropriate.
Thus, since the I.C.R. 35 motion was grounded in part by a request that
the plea agreement be honored, instead of denying it, the court should have
reduced the sentence to alleviate the problems caused by the court itself.

In this case the court advised the defendant only that it was "not necessarily
bound by the sentence negotiations." (Tr. 11/4/05, p. 2, In. 3.) Thus, Appellant
alternatively asserts that the plea was not knowingly or intelligently made since
while she knew that the court did not have to follow the recommendation, she
was unaware that the court may not even consider it.

Another problem occurs with the court's ruling regarding the defendant's
argument that one defendant received the benefit of a plea negotiation and the
other did not. The court ruled that each case is evaluated on an individual basis
and not only is such an argument irrelevant, but disingenuous.

While it is

unclear to Appellant just exactly what the court meant by this, Appellant asserts
that any interpretation of it is contrary to the relevant legal standards.
While the disparity of sentences (or lack thereof) between co-defendants
may not render a sentence

per se

unreasonable, the sentence of a co-

defendant in the same case is of course relevant, and arguing that it is so is
.~
asserts that the district court abused its
certainly not d i ~ i n ~ e n u o u sAppellant
discretion by what appears to be its categorical refusal to consider the codefendant's

sentence

while evaluating the proper sentence for Ms.

Halbesleben.
Finally, Appellant argues that the sentence was unreasonably harsh when
imposed (and so also should have been reduced pursuant to the Rule 35 motion)
because the court ran the sentences consecutive to each other.

Sfate v.

Amerson, 129 ldaho 395,406, 925 P.2d 399,410 (Ct.App. 1996), shows that the
structuring of multiple sentences can result in an unreasonably harsh total
sentence, even if the individual sentences themselves are not.
Amerson followed Stafe v. Alberts, 121 ldaho 204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct.App.

' Significantly,

in Sfafe v. Izaguirre, 145 ldaho 820, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct.App.
2008), the ldaho Court of Appeals reviewed at length the sentences of similar
crimes in published decisions which were not even connected to that case. Id.,
186 P.3d p. 680.

1992), in reducing a sentence by ordering consecutive sentences to instead run
concurrent. In Alberfs, the Court of Appeals provided a valuable review of other
cases in which the ldaho Supreme Court had modified sentences from running
consecutively to concurrent:
In the Dunnagan case, two defendants, who were 20 and 21 years
of age respectively, and who had "very low IQ's", each received
eleven sentences for a series of grand larceny and burglary
convictions. Their sentences essentially amounted to an initial
period of fourteen years followed by another, consecutive sentence
of fourteen years, for a total of twenty-eight years. Although the
Supreme Court recognized the discretionary authority of the trial
court to impose sentences within the maximum limits set by statute,
and also to require that the sentences be served consecutively, the
Court ordered a modification of the sentences. The Court said:
One of the objects of our system of criminal justice is
rehabilitation. Either or both of these unfortunate
young men should be able to benefit, if at all, from
what rehabilitative programs are available, within a
fourteen year period. Under these circumstances, to
impose a sentence which was more than double [sic]
the length of their current natural lives was excessive
and unduly harsh. Accordingly, it is the court's
decision that the two fourteen-year sentences should
run concurrently, and we remand with instructions to
the district court to amend its order of commitment so
as to cause the sentences to so run.
101 ldaho at 126, 609 P.2d at 658.
In Drapeau, the Court modified a sentence for attempt to commit
infamous crime against nature by ordering that it be served
concurrently -- rather than consecutively as specified by the trial
court -- with a sentence for assault with intent to commit infamous
crime, because the two crimes "arose out of the same act." 97
ldaho at 693, 551 P.2d at 980. In Monroe, the defendant had pled
guilty to three counts of forgery. After accepting the guilty plea, the
district court sentenced Monroe to fourteen years upon each count
and ordered that the terms be served consecutively rather than
concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
conviction but ordered modification of the sentence. The Court said:

We believe that under the circumstances of this case
in which the forged checks were all obtained as part
of a common plan or scheme and cashed as part of
that common plan or scheme and in which the
aggregate amount of the forged checks was only $
50.00, the imposition of three consecutive fourteen
year sentences was unduly harsh and an abuse of
discretion. The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but
the sentence imposed is ordered modified to provide
that the three fourteen year sentences run
concurrently.
97 ldaho at 457, 546 P.2d at 854. Finally, in Ross, the Court
modified the sentences imposed for lewd conduct with a minor.
Ross had been found guilty by a jury on three charges of sexually
molesting two girls, ages five and six. The district court imposed
sentences of ten years on each count and ordered that the
sentences be served consecutively. The Supreme Court modified
the sentences, on appeal, explaining:
The court, by its judgment of conviction, sentenced
appellant to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed
10 years on each of the three counts. I.C. 3 18-308 . .
. would require these sentences to run consecutively;
and the judgment does not provide that they run
concurrently. Under all of the circumstances of this
case it is the consensus of this court that a total
indeterminate sentence of 30 years of penal servitude
is unduly harsh and that the sentences on each of the
three counts should run concurrently.
The judgment of conviction
sentence structure thereof is
provide that the sentences
servitude on each of
run concurrently.

is affirmed, but the
ordered modified to
of 10 years penal
the three counts

92 ldaho at 718,449 P.2d at 378 (citation omitted)
Alberfs at p. 207-208.
Also following Amerson, supra, in Sfafe v. Castro, 131 ldaho 274, 954
P.2d 692 (Ct.App. 1998), the ldaho Court of Appeals reduced the defendant's
sentence from two 14 year fixed sentences running consecutive, to shorter

sentences running concurrent (14 years with the first 10 years fixed concurrent to
a 10 year fixed sentence):
According to the PSI report, Castro, at the time of sentencing, was
twenty-one years old and affiliated with a gang. Admittedly, Castro's
short life has, thus far, consisted of extensive criminal activity. At
age nine, Castro was adjudicated for theft in Oregon. Since that
first offense, Castro has committed numerous crimes, spanning
from Oregon to Idaho.
In addition, Castro conducted himself in an abhorrent manner while
incarcerated and awaiting the district court's sentence in this case.
The district court, aware of this information, imposed the maximum
sentence on both counts, fourteen years for grand theft and ten
years for burglary, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively
for a total of twenty-four years fixed. The district court stated that
Castro is either an "individual who has gone through some
experiences that have created severe . . . emotional and
psychological instability, or that [he is] an individual who doesn't
care, and in fact enjoys crime--enjoys hurting people. I don't know
which one it is."
In light of his criminal record, we agree that society needs
protection from Castro until such time that parole authorities may
determine him suitable for an intensively supervised release.
However, twenty-four years fixed is excessive and unreasonable,
defeating any hope of rehabilitation while within the prison system.
Castro is twenty-one years old and is being sentenced for crimes
arising out of a single incident. The sentences, as imposed, would
require Castro to spend a large portion of his adult life in prison
without any opportunity or encouragement to prove that the
decisions he made in his early adult life were youthful mistakes and
that he can effectuate a change in his attitude, modifying his
criminal behavior. Although Castro has committed serious crimes,
we conclude that he should not be required to serve the maximum
possible sentence in each case consecutively without being given
any chance to prove that he is suitable for a parole-supervised
release.

In our case, Ms. Halbesleben did not have an extensive criminal history
(basically none), nor did she behave abhorrently while incarcerated. While
multiple charges were of course involved, the underlying conduct was the same.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Halbesleben respectfully requests that this Court allow her to
withdraw her-guilty pleas, or in the alternative, requests that this Court vacate her
sentence and remand this matter for resentencing before a different judge, or as
a further alterative, Ms.

Halbesleben requests that this court reduce her

sentence to one that is reasonable by restructuring the fixed terms of her
sentences by running them concurrent.
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